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Abstract 
The following work shall critique the bodies of the law regarding to armed conflict 
and international criminal law for their inadequacy in addressing wartime sexual 
assault through failure to define, incorporate, and progressively interpret international 
statute to encompass sexual assault as a global crime. In order to illustrate this 
point, this essay will provide a socio-historic examination of the international legal 
development of sexual assault and an analysis of what makes it a ‘gendered’ crime. 
The second section shall then critically assess attempts to prohibit sexual assault in 
the Geneva Conventions, and how its recognition and prosecution under ‘grave 
breaches’ can be problematic. The third section then examines the decisions made 
at the ICTY and ICTR to define rape under “greater” crimes such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity. The overall evaluation of the above shall provide a socio-
legal account of the woman’s subordinate and decentralized status in international 
law by revealing its weaknesses in offering her protection against such a pervasive 
and heinous crime. 
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Introduction 
In the past, international law managed to overlook growing tensions surrounding the 
occurrence of sexual assault against women during wartime.1 It was not until the 
1990s that global legal institutions started to work towards prioritizing and securing 
women’s substantive justice.2 This is evident in the proactive undertakings of 
International Humanitarian Law instruments and recent decisions made by the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The 
judgments made in these tribunals have contributed to women’s justice by 
attempting to define, incorporate, and progressively interpret international statute to 
encompass sexual assault as a worldwide crime.3 Yet, for many women, sexual 
assault during armed conflict remains an ongoing reality4 despite these 
developments. Furthermore, it can be said that justice as defined by the law may not 
necessarily coincide with the justice women deserve. This work argues that despite 
the expansion of literature on wartime sexual assault, international law continues to 
fall short of protecting and providing redress to women. Furthermore, it decentralizes 
them as agents of their own experience due to the inadequacy in defining, 
incorporating, and prosecuting sexual assault as an international crime.  
This work attempts to prove this by firstly providing a socio-historic 
examination of the legal development of sexual assault on an international scale. It 
also aims to analyse the role of gender in the enactment of this offence. The second 
section critically assesses articles within the Geneva conventions relating to the 
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prohibition of sexual assault; particular attention shall be paid to the difficulties of 
encompassing this act within “grave breaches” of humanitarian law. In the third 
section, the decisions in Akayesu5, Furundzija6, and Foča7, are examined to critique 
the evolution of the definition of rape and the associated problems in its prosecution 
under “greater” crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity. By the end, 
this work will provide an explanation as to why international measures to protect and 
provide justice for female sufferers of sexual assault fall short of their obligations. 
Within this essay the crime of sexual assault shall be termed interchangeably as 
“rape”. 
 
Past Failures to Address Wartime Sexual assault 
Sexual assault has proved itself to be an ongoing and therefore familiar narrative 
during armed conflict, which has caught the attention of feminist scholars and, later, 
the international community. It is a phenomenon that is pervasive, and arguably, 
gendered in nature, given that women are more often than not primary targets of this 
form of violence (which is not to ignore male victims, only to emphasize the element 
of gender discrimination inherent in this form of crime). To highlight this, one only 
needs to look towards the impartial presence of sexual assault against women, 
unconfined to appearing in times of war but also during times of peace.8 It is 
pervasive for the fact that it is widespread and systematically to further illustrate 
woman’s position in society as subordinate to man.9 Additionally, to contribute to its 
gendered aspect, according to Brownmiller, rape is a “conscious process of 
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dominance and intimidation in which all men keep all women in a constant state of 
fear…” done to “exert power and control over the female body”.10 Armed conflict 
therefore inspires a destructive podium11 for misogynistic ideas to manifest, and it 
does on an amplified scale, which marks the crime’s opportunistic nature.12 
Historically, it was a rare occurrence that wartime sexual assault against 
women was reported and thus under-represented in International Criminal 
Proceedings13 despite the prevalence of its occurrence. For example, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Far East failed to prosecute crimes committed 
against women sold into slavery to Japanese soldiers, namely those who have come 
to be known as ‘comfort women’.14 Horrors such as the “rape of Berlin”15 have too, 
been ignored. In each of these cases the international community preferred to view 
these situations in a peripheral sense to greater crimes. Conceptualized as a mere 
‘by-product’16 of war, these atrocities against women did not carry the weight of 
international prosecution or responsibility. This begs the question: where is the 
woman in international law? This is certainly not the first instance in which she has 
been cast aside and ‘decentralized’, her suffering regarded as an inevitable ‘by-
product’. During war, she is an entity that is not central to the narrative frequently told 
by man, reduced to the function of her reproductive system. As evidenced through 
past failures, the law had failed to suppress and compensate victims for these 
crimes.  
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It was not until the 1990s17, that significant change occurred for women in the 
area of gender justice. This can be attributed to the radical shift in perception of 
sexual assault not merely being a ‘by-product’ of war but, more accurately, used as a 
“weapon of war”.1819 Past understandings of wartime rape as inevitable occurrences 
were unreliable; this is because these beliefs denied the woman her bodily autonomy 
and cast her trauma in conflict as secondary—the woman a silent survivor of a crime 
unattended to20. It can be argued that the ‘weapon of war’ rhetoric is more forward 
thinking as it denounces the conceptions of the crime as a passive atrocity, and 
concurrently shrugs off the understanding of rape as a normative act that women 
have suffered for centuries21. However, it is telling that the use of this newfound 
terminology asserts that rape is a ‘weapon’ against the enemy, because it 
demonstrates that the violence employed against women isn’t so much about the 
women than it is about ‘hurting’ the enemy.22  
This very idea was dealt with in the 1990’s during the ICTR and ICTY 
tribunals, which also contributed greatly to changes to the Geneva Conventions and 
whose judgments revolutionized the understanding of wartime sexual assault. It can 
be assumed that since these laws help shed light on woman’s suffering during 
wartime that notable improvements in the area of gender justice have been made; 
these progressions have been hailed furthermore as significant achievements in the 
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war against impunity23 towards women. Yet, critics claim that international law is still 
inadequate in addressing the woman’s experience24 in armed conflict, expressing 
that gaps in knowledge and protection25 need to be confronted. To counter this, the 
ICRC maintains that the failure is not in the law itself but more so in the lack of its 
proper enforcement.26 The Laws of Armed Conflict along with its relationship to 
International Criminal Law mechanisms need to be scrutinized in detail with regards 
to their relation to wartime gender based violence in order to determine the 
adequacy of international law in centralizing the woman in war. This shall be 
demonstrated below. 
 
International Humanitarian Law 
Coming into force after the Second World War, International Humanitarian Law has 
played an integral role in regulating the conduct of war, and has added to the 
protection of women against sexual assault through its attempts to prevent and 
condemn these actions during conflict.27 The main bodies of law governing war are 
the Geneva Conventions, the fourth of which deals with the role of women as 
civilians in armed conflict. Prior to the incorporation of more specific laws pertaining 
to sexual assault into the statute, IHL claimed to grant unbiased protection towards 
women, boasting an interpretation of ‘equality’28 throughout the four Conventions 
and two Protocols. Due to laws already being in place for the safeguarding of 
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general civilian and combatant populations during armed conflict29, why should new 
gender-centric laws be considered? In light of this question, academics have pointed 
out the discriminatory characteristics of international humanitarian law, stating that 
the framework clearly prioritizes male combatants while women are regarded as 
either victims or child-bearers.30 31 It is due to such prejudiced contextualization of 
women, along with weak attempts to ban and prioritize sexual assault as a crime that 
the protection of women is subject to obscurity in the Geneva Conventions. 
 
‘Honor’ Talk and Victim Framing 
Discriminatory examples of this legislation are most evident through the terminology 
used to protect women against the crime of sexual assault, which is addressed in the 
gendered language of ‘chastity and modesty’32. For example, Article 27 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention 1949 aims to prevent sexual assault against women through 
protecting her ‘honor' in wartime. This is problematic due to its indirect means of 
prohibition33 and outdated use of language.34 Furthermore, in light of this, it is 
important to ask whose honor the law really protects—the woman’s or her 
husband's?35 This is relevant especially in relation to value-centric terms such as 
‘honor’, which were not uncommon to public understanding of the role of women in 
the 1940s.36 To further illustrate the troublesome framing of the woman through 
‘honor’, one must ask if this is to say she is effectively ‘dishonored’ after being victim 
to sexual assault? If so, what does it speak for her place in society? Additionally, a 
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more general protection for women through “Family Honor” is also mentioned in 
Article 46 of Geneva Conventions IV 1949; this proves the statute’s limited range of 
protection for women37 as it regards her protection only through her role in the family 
which supports archaic societal perceptions of gender roles.  
A contradiction exists in the Law of Armed Conflict, as it aims to uplift the 
woman, but in so doing it only perpetuates restricted narratives of her as a victim or 
mother. The problem of centrality once again appears in this analysis, as the woman, 
although proposed in the above cases as a subject of law, is treated as more of an 
object and appears in the line of protection as a mere afterthought. Limited as a 
subject to her archetypal role in the family and encompassed by vague, outdated 
statutes that nurture societal expectations of her gender, protection for the woman in 
war is severely limited. However, following the implementation of the Additional 
Protocols 1970, rape is explicitly mentioned as a crime against women during conflict 
while the language of honor is left behind: 
 
Women shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in 
particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of 
indecent assault.38 
 
 While it can be seen as a positive development that law recognizes women’s 
vulnerability during war, it is disadvantageous on the other to assume that this 
vulnerability exists solely on account of a women’s sexual or child-bearing 
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functions.39 It can be said that the Geneva Conventions are insufficient as they fail to 
uphold a truer universal reality of sexual assault against women during wartime.40 
 
‘Grave Breaches’: Feeble Attempts to Prioritize Women 
Another way in which international humanitarian law falls short of providing effective 
protection measures for women is the omission and prioritization of rape as an 
element of ‘grave breaches’. Defined as serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, contravention of such measures shall be punishable under 
universal jurisdiction.41 Outlined throughout the four conventions and Protocol I, 
these violations mark the Geneva Convention’s relationship with International 
Criminal Law through its potential and ability to prosecute and punish crimes at 
international criminal courts and tribunals. Nevertheless, this road to redress is 
arguably of no help to women as women’s rights experts protest the failure to include 
gender-based crimes such as rape in the mention of grave breaches, which list just 
“…willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, including biological experiments, 
willfully causing suffering or serious injury to body or health…”42 as examples. In 
recent developments, however, attempts to progressively interpret grave breaches 
clauses to include wartime rape and other instances of gender-based violence have 
been made, though it has proved difficult to successfully do so. In defense of the 
absence of an outright prohibition, Khushalani argued that the grave breaches of 
“torture or inhuman treatment” and “willful causing of suffering or serious injury of 
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body or health” could be progressively interpreted to include rape against women as 
a violation.43 
The above is evidenced through the Celebici case, held at the ICTY where 
three members of the Bosnian armed forces, Mucić, Delić, and Landžo, were 
charged with grave breaches against Bosnian-Serb civilians held in the Celebici 
prison camp in Central Bosnia and Herzegovina44. It was imparted by witnesses at 
the trial that the civilians were “tortured, beaten to death by guards wielding baseball 
bats, set on fire, and raped.”45 It was the indictment of Hazim Delić, more 
specifically, which dealt with rape constituting the offense of torture under grave 
breaches of international humanitarian law: 
 
…the violence suffered by Ms. Cecez in the form of rape, was inflicted 
upon her by Delić because she is a woman… this represents a form of 
discrimination which constitutes a prohibited purpose for the offence of 
torture.46  
 
 Consequently, rape was rendered a violation of grave breaches through the 
progressive interpretation of international humanitarian law despite of its lack of 
direct prohibition under the Geneva Conventions. Proponents of this progressive 
interpretation have commended the contributions it has made to the agenda of 
protecting women during wartime, stating that though dated, the Geneva 
Conventions should be read in the light of today’s world, and therefore principles 
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harnessed from existing statute can be used to combat newer crimes.47 However, 
this notion has received backlash with sceptics stating a strong preference for 
explicit, rather than implied prohibitions of wartime rape.48 This lack of outright 
prohibition speaks levels as to international law’s lack of will to prioritize and 
centralize women in armed conflict. The above case demonstrates that though law 
will bend over backwards to interpret existing statute to cater for female victims of 
wartime rape, it is reluctant to establish rape as a crime beyond doubt, which furthers 
the opinion that the laws meant to protect women ultimately fail them. 
 
Post-War Justice Mechanisms 
Ad hoc criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia have been 
instrumental in addressing sexual assault against women. Established by the UN to 
prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide49 in the respective 
areas, both tribunals have made advances in additionally encompassing wartime 
rape within the more serious crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. This 
has effectively widened the potential for rape to be prosecuted as an international 
crime, for perpetrators to be held individually responsible, and for victims to be justly 
compensated.50 It is suggested that this can fill in the gaps left by the Geneva 
Conventions in defining the crime of sexual assault, given that international criminal 
courts have the authority to “promote progressive, creative interpretation of IHL’S 
key texts.”51. Moreno furthermore considers recent developments in this area to 
mark a ‘new era’ in international law to ”protect the victims; to end gender crimes” 
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and “to ensure that peace and justice work hand in hand.”52. However it also rings 
true that despite these improvements in structuring and refining sexual assault within 
the ad hoc criminal statutes, sentencing of offenders remains scarce and lenient.53 
Adding to this, others have drawn attention to the problem of sentencing rape under 
‘greater’ crimes, which introduces questions of whether in prosecuting rape under 
genocide or crimes against humanity that rape, as a singular act, is trivialized in 
comparison, thus ridding the crime of its true gravity.54 This being said, the full range 
of consequences that stem from women’s suffering is not entirely taken into account. 
Wartime rape is still wrongly categorized as will be shown through the imperfect 
construction of its definition and failure to legitimize it as an international crime in and 
of itself.  
 
Defining Rape at the ICTR and ICTY 
Hailed as a groundbreaking landmark judgment55 in the writings on wartime sexual 
assault, Prosecutor v. Akayesu56 presents to be the very first case to consider the 
definition of rape within the context of international law.57 While this was a positive 
step in the direction of recognizing women’s adversity in wartime, less-than-
progressive decisions at the ICTY have since followed, notably in the cases 
Furundzija and Foča.  
Akayesu criticized domestic law definitions of rape, claiming that they put too 
much emphasis on factors such as the type of penetration and consent58, and thus 
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rejected them in order to build a more victim-oriented approach. The Trial Chamber 
emphasized that wartime rape could not be adequately captured in the narrative of 
“objects and body parts”59 and therefore attempted to make it so that non-consent on 
the victim’s part is readily assumed in the context of coercive circumstances (which 
war often necessitates). It was therefore held that rape is to be defined as a “physical 
invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are 
coercive.”60 It is a victory for women that this definition is deliberately broad since it 
has potential to include a wider array of sexual harms against the person so long as 
coercion is proved. This definition of rape has been championed by feminist legal 
theorists61 who have expressed that sexual assault is finally reflected in the law as it 
occurs in life. It can also be said to promote international awareness of the woman in 
law as a multi-dimensional62 figure, as she is handled still on the national level 
through familiar and restrictive ‘objects and body parts’ rhetoric in relation to sexual 
assault.  
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However, similar sentiments failed to be endorsed in Furundzija, a case heard 
at the ICTY concerning the use of sexual assault in interrogations, which adopted a 
more mechanical approach to defining rape. Where Akayesu was broad and 
considerate of outside circumstances involving consent and force, Furundzija 
signaled a backward step in the international attempt to define sexual assault.63 The 
objective elements laid out in Furundzija are as follows: 
 
 (i) the sexual penetration, however slight 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or 
any other object used by the perpetrator;                   or 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.64 
 
 It was argued in Furundzija that the definition found in Akayesu was not built 
upon any customary agreement as to what is considered sexual assault and was 
therefore not worthy of international consolidation.65 This is yet another example of 
international law failing to view the woman as a whole, focusing instead on the need 
for “force” or “threat of force”, which ultimately limits sexual assault to taking place 
solely when coercive circumstances are judged as forceful or threatening. The “body 
parts” narrative rears its ugly head again in this case, eliminating any chance for the 
victim’s agency or lack thereof in determining the crime. 
The ICTY then tried to create balance between the definitions in Akayesu and 
Furundzija66 in its attempt to bring the judgments closer together in Foča. While trial 
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judges agreed that the definition in Akayesu was too broad, it was also revealed that 
Furundzija, although appropriate in the sense that the first article defining rape may 
constitute the actus reus of the crime, was excessively narrow in its approach 
towards “force” or “threat of force” with regards to coercive measures.67 Further, it 
took a similar position to that in Akayesu by confirming that given the circumstances 
of conflict in nurturing coercive situations, consent would be near impossible on the 
part of the victim.68 It is evident that in defining sexual assault, Foča tried to revive 
Akayesu’s legacy by expanding the definition of rape with special regard to the 
victims consent. The determinant of the actus reus of rape was therefore “sexual 
penetration, however slight” which “occurs without the consent of the victim”. The 
mens rea was consequently the intention to carry out sexual penetration with the 
knowledge that the victim has not voluntarily consented.69 
The consent-oriented approach centralizes the female victim compared to the 
Furundzija definition, which conversely reduces her to mere fragments of her body. 
While still garnering inspiration from Furundzija in developing a formula-based 
approach to the actus reus of rape, semblances of Akayesu are also tied into Foča’s 
conception of rape. Thia is shown through its consideration for the woman’s inability 
to voluntarily consent in conflict-ridden situations. It can be said that international 
criminal law has positively developed the jurisprudence surrounding rape because 
more attention has been paid to women and the importance of translating their 
experience of conflict into the law, despite a few setbacks.70 However, it is important 
to note that although this move forward signals a small triumph for women, 
international criminal law still fails to offer an adequate definition as it still aligns itself 
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with domestic conceptions of rape. The approach to prosecuting rape is still too 
mechanical to consider this a clear victory for women. Once again, too much gravity 
is placed on the material elements and not enough leeway is given for consideration 
of broader circumstances. For that reason, it comes as no surprise that rape is still 
not given the weight it deserves in the international sphere and is not prosecuted 
nearly enough to provide redress for women.  
As it stands, Akayesu may still be considered to be the leading definition for 
rape in international criminal law as it is the most progressive of the definitions in 
terms of its wide scope for development in international criminal justice.71 Akayesu 
carries with it the hope for women’s justice because it extends its conceptual 
definition to encompass a vast array of circumstances where non-consensual 
penetration is involved. 
 
Rape as Constitutive Acts of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity 
Looking towards the prosecution of rape under ‘greater’ crimes, the cases of 
Akayesu and Foča must be critically reviewed to showcase international law’s failure 
to centralize woman. Charged with genocide at the ICTR, Akayesu marks a massive 
step forward in international law with regards to the recognition of the crimes of rape 
and sexual violence as constitutive acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. 
Although the accused had not personally committed acts of rape, his case was used 
as a platform to confer responsibility onto him as superior leader of the armed 
militia/police, whom under his direction took hundreds of Tutsi women and carried 
out sexual violations against them.72 In linking rape to genocide in Akayesu, the 
tribunal had be creative in carving this link out of existing law on genocide, which 
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requires the act to be carried out with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial and religious group,” with particular attention to ‘causing 
serious bodily or mental harm’ or ‘imposing measures intended to prevent births’ in 
the targeted group.73 It was later agreed that rape and other forms of sexual violence 
fell within the scope of Article 2 section (b), stating that “rape and sexual violence 
certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the victims… 
resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women…”74. The Trial 
Chamber also pointed out the integral nature of rape in the accused’s aim of specific 
destruction of Tutsi women and specifically contributing not only to their destruction 
but also to the group as a whole.75 76 This has made it so that should specific intent 
be proven in future armed conflicts where sexual assault has taken place, that rape 
can be prosecutable as an international offense. But what if specific intent cannot be 
proven and thus rendering rape unable to be charged through genocide? This brings 
us back to the centrality narrative brought up in the document. The crime of rape is 
only as good as the ‘larger’ crime being presented—the woman is yet again 
displaced as secondary in her suffering under sexual assault.  
Another crime under which rape is recognized in international criminal law to 
be a violation is Crimes Against Humanity. The Foča case, aside from being notable 
for its attempts at providing further clarity in the definition of rape in international law, 
is also a leading decision as it marks history as the first case of its kind to solely 
prosecute for the crimes of sexual assault against women.77 The accused, three 
Bosnian Serb commanders: Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovik, were found guilty of 
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crimes against humanity and international humanitarian law. The crimes of rape, 
enslavement, torture and outrages against personal dignity were also considered 
under these charges.78 The three accused had a role in organizing and maintaining 
the rape camp in the eastern Bosnian town of Foča. As mentioned previously, the 
definition of rape in this case which tried to bridge Akayesu’s conceptual approach 
and Furundzija’s more mechanical outlook has aided in rape’s position within crimes 
against humanity. It was interpreted that the crime of rape (which also constitutes 
sexual slavery) that took place in Foča is regarded as forming part of a widespread 
and systematic attack against the population in Foča with regards to Article 5 of 
ICTY’s statute. However, as with genocide, the main problem that arises from 
prosecuting rape under other provisions such as torture or Crimes Against Humanity 
is that it ultimately serves to obscure the sexual nature of the crime itself.79 This may 
produce positive or negative effects depending on the woman survivor and how they 
wish to frame their own narrative.80 
 
Prosecution Matters: Redress for the Woman? 
The issue of prosecuting under ‘greater’ crimes adds to the perception that justice for 
women is an underwhelming phenomenon.81 Gender crimes are only made 
exceptional and prosecutable at an international criminal level because they are 
frequently done in the contexts of more acknowledged crimes such as genocide or 
crimes against humanity82, which makes the issue seem secondary and not as grave 
as the crime under which it is prosecuted. In such cases, it is argued that 
international law’s primary focus is on catching the male perpetrator instead of 
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providing justice to the female victim.83 This renders the indirect means of 
prosecution for rape seemingly sufficient enough for international acceptance, in that 
prosecution under readily existing crimes will do. This is a disservice not only to the 
decentralized woman in war but also to the international legal order in that the law is 
trying to stretch the definitions existing crimes to support a crime that was previously 
not even considered to be a bona fide international violation.  
This quasi-representation through implied incorporation, in effect, minimizes 
the violence of the act and also takes away the its gendered quality. Rape is 
understood as an attack against women (which in most cases is the reality), a group 
violation, due to the fact that she is a woman and that she is constructed by the 
society around her to be subjected and targeted for that very reason.84 This makes it 
all the more troubling to know that this form of gendered violence is not adequately 
handled on an international level, as demonstrated through the cases provided 
above. In relation to rape’s definition under international law, one argues that a more 
holistic approach, one that considers the victim’s experience of wartime rape and 
every circumstance eliciting non-voluntary consent, should be endorsed. Much like 
the definition in Akayesu, the law needs to find a way to place the woman in the 
center and provide her with adequate protection and redress measures in order to 
truly cater for the needs of the international female populace.  
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Conclusion 
Taking all aspects into consideration, it is evident that while the Geneva Conventions 
and International Criminal Law mechanisms are steadily working towards defining, 
incorporating, and prosecuting the offense of sexual assault, these progresses are 
hindered by the failure of these institutions to do so successfully. The underlying 
problem in each of the cases presented above is the gross underrepresentation of 
the primary victim of the crime of wartime rape—the woman. Had the women’s 
experiences been central in determining constituents and elements of the crime, 
perhaps the development of this violation within the laws of armed conflict and 
international criminal tribunals would have already made significant progress in 
today’s world. It is known that women as a majority still fall victim to these heinous 
crimes worldwide. International Law needs to start centralizing women’s experiences 
in order to fulfill its international legal obligations to protect them and safeguard their 
interests for justice. Perhaps only though this will International Law start to redefine 
and readdress sexual assault in a way that benefits and centralizes the woman. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
